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RECENT DECISIONS 
CIVIL PROCEDURE-INTERPLEADER-R.!GHT TO JURY TRIAL-Decedent 
brought suit against applicant for personal injuries sustained in a collision 
but died before judgment. His administrator continued the suit under a 
statute which allowed survival of the action only if the injuries did not 
cause death.1 His widow filed an action under the wrongful death statute,2 
alleging that the injuries from the collision caused death. Applicant sought 
to have the administrator and the widow interpleaded to adjudicate between 
themselves the cause of death. On appeal from a judgment dismissing 
applicant's bill, held, reversed. The interpleader statute3 authorizes such 
interpleading to prevent applicant's exposure to double recovery for a single 
liability. The proceeding being "equitable" in nature, there is no right 
to a jury determination of the cause of death.4 Plaza Express Co. v. Gallo-
way, (Mo. 1955) 280 S.W. (2d) 17. 
It is certainly both permissible and desirable to allow interpleader on 
the facts of the principal case so as to avoid the possibility of two separate 
juries holding the applicant liable in both actions upon inconsistent find-
ings as to the same fact.5 Although the court recognized that the statute 
has materially modified former equitable interpleader so as to permit the · 
applicant's bill, 6 it went on to label the entire proceeding as essentially 
"equitable" in nature. Under the typical state constitutional guarantee 
that "the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate,"7 
the effect of this labeling is to deny a right to determination of fact issues 
by a jury where such a right would have existed if the claimants' original 
actions had remained separate.8 This is improper. Under code pleading, 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §537.020. 
2 Id., §§537.070 to 537.090. 
3 Id., §507.060 [substantially identical to rule 22 (I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 28 U.S.C. (1952)]. 
4 Three judges dissenti:d on the issue of the right to a jury trial. 
5 Separate juries might arrive at different results as to the cause of death in the re• 
spective actions by the two claimants. The court in the principal case pointed out that 
neither proceeding would be res judicata as to the other despite the identical issue in com-
mon, since the widow and the administrator were different parties, and nothing appeared to 
show that the widow was beneficially interested in the administrator's action. 
6 Under equity practice unmodified by statute, strict interpleader was precluded if 
the applicant was interested in the fund, debt, or duty which was the subject matter of the 
action. Pope v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., (Mo. 1915) 175 S.W. 955. A bill in the nature of 
interpleader could be brought by an interested applicant, but only if he could demonstrate 
grounds for equitable jurisdiction independent of the double vexation. Dom v. Fox, 61 
N.Y. 264 (1874). See the classic statement of the prerequisites to interpleader in POMEROY, 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4th ed., §1322 (1919), and the discussion of them by Chafee, "Mod-
ernizing Interpleader," 30 YALE L. J. 814 (1921). Cf. Chafee, "Federal Interpleader Since 
the Act of 1936," 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940), also discussing federal rule 22 (see note 3 supra). 
7 Mo. CoNsr., art. 3, §22 (a). 
s Seemingly an action for a declaratory judgment as to the cause of death would also 
have been available for relief from exposure to double liability. Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) 
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the civil form of action is neither equitable nor legal.9 Yet the former dis-
tinctions remain important for settling constitutional jury rights. No 
problems in determining the right to a jury arise when the modern "civil 
action" presents issues which would have been clearly within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of either the law judge or the chancellor under former practice. 
But the proceeding involved in the principal case embraced both a request 
for interpleading, which would have been within the chancellor's jurisdic-
tion, and also the issue of the cause of death, which would have been with-
in the jurisdiction of the law judge and jury. Judicial determination of 
the latter issue cannot be deemed an instance of the chancellor's power to 
render complete relief once jurisdiction has been obtained, since equity 
would not have taken jurisdiction at all in this case.10 The expanded 
statutory interpleader is neither "legal" nor "equitable," but sui generis.11 
The problem of jury rights cannot be solved satisfactorily by picking a 
label for the entire action when "legal" and "equitable" issues are joined 
under modern combined procedure. Rather, an attempt should be made 
to preserve jury determination of issues which call for legal relief and 
which typically would have been tried by a jury.12 An evaluation of evi-
§§527.010 to 527.140 (substantially the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act). See :BOR-
CHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 363-365, 396, 397 (1941), on the relation of inter-
pleader to declaratory judgments and declarations of facts. Such a proceeding would not 
have precluded the claimants' right to a jury trial. State ex rel. United States Fire Ins. Co. 
v. Terte, 351 Mo. 1089, 176 S.W. (2d) 25 (1943); Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 240 
Mo. App. 355, 200 S.W. (2d) 375 (1947). In 13 A.L.R. (2d) 777 at 782 (1950), the general 
rule is stated "that if defendant would have a right to a jury trial if the action was 
brought by him he would also have it in a declaratory judgment action by the plaintiff." 
9 "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " Mo. Rev. Stat. 
(1949) §506.040: 
10 "No case is cited authorizing a tort-feasor to require persons, each claiming the sole 
right to damages for the same tort [to be interpleaded ... ]. The remarkable situation 
which would result would be far more productive of injustice than it will be to require 
defendant to take his chances on two juries coming to the same conclusion on the facts.'' 
Pope v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., note 6 supra, at 957. 
11 In Crollard v. Northern Life Ins. Co., note 8 supra, at 367, involving the right to 
jury trial in declaratory judgment actions, the Kansas City Court of Appeals stated: "A 
proceeding for a declaratory judgment under our statute is sui generis and is not of itself 
strictly either legal or equitable, although its historical affinity is equitable.'' It is sug-
gested that the same is true of the statutory interpleader action. 
12 In Lee v. Conran, 213 Mo. 404 at 412, 111 S.W. 1151 (1908), the Missouri court 
held: "If the issues joined entitle the parties to an ordinary judgment at law, ••• the 
parties are entitled to a trial by a jury; but if the issues tendered are equitable in their 
nature and caIJ for equitable relief, then the cause is triable before the chancellor.'' :But see 
McCaskill, "Jury Demands in the New Federal Procedure," 88 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 315 (1940), 
disapproving attempts to predicate jury rights upon the nature of the issues alone, since 
often the same facts or issues could have appeared in either a law or an equity action, 
with the character of the action determining jury rights. This being true does not, how-
ever, aid in characterizing a purely statutory action, nor does it supply a label for modern 
proceedings which join actions for both "equitable" and "legal" relief arising out of the 
same transaction. 
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dence and a finding as to whether particular injuries did or did not cause 
death are typically within the province of a jury, and a jury determina-
tion of this issue could have been granted in the principal case without 
complicating the action.13 In fact, under the majority's holding, a jury 
trial must still be had for the negligence and damage issues in an action at 
law by the claimant prevailing in the present action. In view of the 
constitutional mandate for preservation of jury trial and the interests of 
efficient judicial administration, the better practice in this situation 
would have been to settle all of the issues among the parties in the single 
satutory action, with a jury passing on the cause of death as well as the 
negligence and damage issues. 
John A. Beach 
lS When "legal" and "equitable" issues are joined, and there is a fact question com-
mon to both, a troublesome problem may be presented as to whether the jury must try 
the legal issue first and thereby foreclose the judge's determination of the fact. The action 
involved in the principal case presented no such difficulty, however. 
